KOTA KINABALU : – The demand by Sabah and Sarawak for 35% of seats in the Dewan Rakyat is not merely a political aspiration; it’s a rectification of historical injustice and a reaffirmation of the foundational principles of Malaysia.
As a federation of three distinct regions, not a unitary state, Malaysia’s original constitutional framework, laid out in the Cobbold Commission, the IGC Report 1962, and the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), explicitly recognized the unique status of the Borneo states.
Parti Kerjasama Anak Negeri president Datuk Henrynus Amin pointed this out in a Letter to Editor on Sunday.
According to Henrynus, historically, at the inception of Malaysia, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore collectively held one-third or 35% of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat.
This was no arbitrary allocation. It was a deliberate electoral architecture designed as a crucial constitutional safeguard.
This arrangement ensured that West Malaysia alone could not unilaterally amend the Federal Constitution, thereby mitigating regional grievances, fears, and distrust towards the Federal Government.
The allocation of seats to the Borneo States considered not just population, but also their vast geographical expanse, strategic location, and development potential.
The drastic shift occurred after Singapore’s departure in 1965. Singapore’s 15 parliamentary seats were reallocated to West Malaysia, leaving Sabah and Sarawak with approximately 25% representation.
This single event stripped the Borneo states of their vital constitutional safeguard, effectively granting West Malaysian political parties unfettered control of the Dewan Rakyat and the Federal Government.
This enabled them to unilaterally amend federal laws, even those with profound impacts on the interests of Sabah and Sarawak.
Thus, the demand for 35% of Dewan Rakyat seats is fundamentally about restoring this critical balance of power and addressing a perceived historical injustice.
The lingering distrust towards the Federal Government in Sabah and Sarawak is well-founded, stemming from a series of historical interventions that underscore the need for this constitutional safeguard. From the ousting of Chief Ministers like Stephen Kalong Ningkan and Tun Fuad Stephens through federal intervention and declarations of emergency, to the controversial acquisition of Sabah and Sarawak’s oil and gas resources, and the subsequent reduction of Sabah’s constitutional status, these events paint a clear picture.
The continuous federal pressure on state governments, including financial strictures and the establishment of parallel development bodies, further solidifies the argument that the Borneo states require greater representation to protect their interests.
These instances demonstrate a consistent pattern of the Federal Government leveraging its numerical advantage in the Dewan Rakyat to exert control and override the autonomy of the Borneo states.
The demand for 35% of seats is therefore not just about numerical representation; it’s about safeguarding regional autonomy and preventing future federal overreach.
Opponents often cite the principle of “one person, one vote” and argue against the “malapportionment” of seats.
However, this argument overlooks the realities of representative democracy.
“One person, one vote” is often a theoretical ideal, not always practically functional within a system where malapportionment of constituencies is common practice, even in mature democracies worldwide.
In a representative democracy, majority rule is determined by elected representatives from their respective constituencies, not by direct popular vote for a head of state.
Furthermore, the suggestion by Peninsula-based NGOs that Sabah and Sarawak accept 35% of seats in the Dewan Negara instead of the Dewan Rakyat is both impractical and misleading.
The Dewan Negara is largely powerless in policy-making, primarily functioning to “rubber stamp” bills already passed by the Dewan Rakyat. Restructuring Dewan Negara seats to accommodate Sabah and Sarawak’s demand is impractical given the fixed representation structure and the limited legislative power of the upper house.
This proposal severely underestimates the intelligence of Sabahans and Sarawakians, who understand the critical difference between symbolic representation and meaningful legislative power.
The unique historical and constitutional context of the Borneo states renders arguments based on internal West Malaysian electoral disparities irrelevant. The fear-mongering that additional seats for Sabah and Sarawak would increase their power and influence, potentially allowing them to form a simple majority with a few more seats from Peninsular Malaysia, merely exposes a reluctance to genuinely share power.
Instead of imposing external political ideals, it is more constructive to adopt a “one country, two systems” framework for Dewan Rakyat seat distribution.
This approach acknowledges the distinct regional considerations of Malaysia.
By allocating one-third or 35% of Dewan Rakyat seats to Sabah and Sarawak as a distinct Borneo region, and two-thirds or 65% to West Malaysia as its own region, Malaysia can forge a pragmatic and historically grounded solution.
This regional distribution respects the spirit of MA63 and is crucial for political stability and national integration.
The demand for 35% of Dewan Rakyat seats is not a whimsical desire; it is a justified, historically rooted, and constitutionally sound demand that aims to restore the original balance of power and safeguard the interests of Sabah and Sarawak within the Malaysian Federation.
Henrynus ended his letter by stressing that it is time for West Malaysians to recognize and respect the foundational rights and unique status of the Borneo states.